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arxivcs.AIcs.GTcs.LGcs.MA2026-07-20

The Curvature Shadow: An Apparent Failure of Maximum-Entropy Equilibrium Selection is a Removable Artifact

Luis Leal

In two-player zero-sum games whose Nash equilibria form a convex set, regularized solvers such as Regularized Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) empirically select the maximum-entropy member: the information projection (I-projection) of a uniform reference onto the Nash set. On a panel of small games this match is exact, with one apparent exception: in Kuhn poker R-NaD lands at bluff coordinate 0.180 while the maximum-entropy member sits at 0.201, a coordinate gap of about 0.021, even though R-NaD attains 99.7 percent of the maximum entropy. We ask whether this gap is a genuine selection bias or an artifact, and answer it quantitatively. We show that for selection on a one-dimensional Nash manifold the coordinate gap factorizes as $\mathrm{gap} \approx \sqrt{2δ/κ}$, where $δ$ is the entropy shortfall of the solver and $κ$ is the curvature of the entropy landscape at its peak. Across five games this relation holds to within $2 \times 10^{-4}$ (under 1 percent relative error). The four matrix games have $δ\approx 0$ (R-NaD reaches the maximum-entropy member exactly) and therefore no gap regardless of curvature; only the sequential game (Kuhn) has $δ> 0$. A causal sweep of the magnet strength drives $δ\to 0$ and the gap toward zero along the predicted curve (fitted scaling exponent 0.50, $R^2 > 0.999999$, against the exact prediction of 1/2), until the dynamics destabilize at a stability floor: behavior consistent with a removable shortfall and inconsistent with a fixed bias. We quantify the curvature half of the law from measured curvatures and flag a moving-target pitfall in the natural Tsallis-entropy experiment. The Kuhn gap is thus the curvature shadow of a small, removable entropy shortfall on an unusually flat peak; the I-projection account is upheld up to a flatness-limited residual.

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