CORTEXA
← Browse
arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.LG2026-06-30

CSO-LLM: Class Subspace Orthogonalization for Post-Training Backdoor Detection and Trigger Inversion in LLMs

Zhengxing Li, David J. Miller, Guangmingmei Yang, George Kesidis

While post-training backdoor detection and trigger inversion schemes have been developed for AIs used e.g. for images, there is a paucity of such methods for LLMs. First, the LLM input space is discrete, with up to 150,000^k k-tuples to consider with k the token-length of a putative trigger. Second, one must blacklist tokens typical of the putative target response (class) of an attack, as such tokens may give false detection signals. However, a comprehensive blacklist is not available, in general, for a given domain. We develop a highly effective detection and inversion framework for LLMs treated as classifiers. Central to our approach is class subspace orthogonalization (CSO), a novel plug-and-play paradigm for backdoor detection that serves two fundamental roles when applied to LLMs: i) it enhances both sensitivity and specificity of a baseline detector; ii) it provides a form of implicit blacklisting, as it penalizes against inclusion, in a candidate trigger, of tokens that induce signal perturbations "in the direction of" the putative target class of an attack. One version of our detector performs continuous optimization in token embedding space, while a companion trigger-inversion and detection method performs greedy accretion in discrete token space. Our methods give both strong detection performance and accurate inversion of ground-truth triggers on several LLM classification domains, and for several different LLM architectures.

View free PDFSource page

Related papers

arxivcs.LGcs.AIcs.CR2026-06-26

TRACE: Trajectory-Based Safety Patch Learning for LLM Post-Training Realignment

Changyue Li, Jiaming He, Youliang Yuan, Jialin Wu, Boxi Yu, Zhicong Huang, et al.

Fine-Tuning-as-a-Service (FTaaS) platforms let users train large language models (LLMs) on customized tasks, but this pipeline could erode models' safety alignment. In practice, service providers need to recover models' safety without re-running full alignment, or destroying the…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.AIcs.CRcs.LG2026-07-21

ResearchArena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in Automated AI R&D

Lena Libon, Ben Rank, Jehyeok Yeon, David Schmotz, Jeremy Qin, Daniel Donnelly, et al.

As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted. AI control offers one such approach: rather than trusting the agent, it treats it as a potential adversary and uses a monitor…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.LGcs.AIcs.CR2026-07-02

kNNGuard: Turning LLM Hidden Activations into a Training-Free Configurable Guardrail

Mahmoud Abdelfattah, Hamid Nasiri, Peter Garraghan

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in domains requiring guardrails to detect unsafe, off-topic, or adversarial prompts. Existing guardrails predominantly rely on fine-tuning to build classifiers, which often suffer from low generalization and high inference la…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.LG2026-07-22

FedLSG: LLM-Enhanced Semantic Calibration for Federated Graph Backdoor Defense

Chenyu Zhou, Yabin Peng, Wei Huang, Kunlin Li, Shuaishuai Zhang, Xinyuan Miao

Federated Graph Neural Networks (FedGNNs) are highly vulnerable to backdoor poisoning, yet existing defenses typically rely on rule-based approaches that lack semantic understanding, making them vulnerable to stealthy triggers and harmful to benign structures. To solve this, we p…

View free PDFSource page