Tecnología y Guerra: un apunte sobre la lucha del silicio
LEGAL REVIEW Segura García, Germán. “Tecnología y Guerra: un apunte sobre la lucha del silicio.” Boletín CODESEL, vol. 2, no. 10, August 2026, ISSN-e: 3045-7750. Review Few elements illustrate the transformation of contemporary strategic competition as clearly as semiconductors, critical minerals and the industrial ecosystems required to produce them. Military power increasingly depends not only upon weapons already available to armed forces, but upon the capacity of States to design, manufacture, sustain and replace technologically sophisticated systems in conditions of geopolitical tension. In this ambitious and highly topical article, Germán Segura García examines the relationship between technology, warfare and economic power through the struggle for control of semiconductor supply chains. The study focuses particularly on competition between the United States and China, while also assessing the strategic consequences for Taiwan and the European Union. Its central argument is compelling: technological sovereignty depends upon much more than possessing scientific knowledge; it requires secure access to raw materials, industrial capacity, advanced manufacturing equipment and resilient supply chains. The article begins from a broad historical proposition: war and technological development have always evolved together. Technological superiority may provide a temporary military advantage, but innovation alone does not guarantee victory, because strategic outcomes also depend upon organisational, political and human factors. Segura García nevertheless emphasises that States cannot neglect the material foundations of military power. Modern defence capabilities require not only technological knowledge but also the industrial infrastructure necessary to transform that knowledge into deployable and sustainable military systems. One of the article’s principal conceptual strengths lies in the distinction between knowing how to manufacture a system and possessing the economic and industrial conditions necessary to manufacture it at scale. The author illustrates this through the example of a reconnaissance drone: technological knowledge must be combined with access to the necessary raw materials and with industries capable of producing and assembling components. This apparently simple distinction provides the analytical foundation for the remainder of the study. Modern technological sovereignty depends upon control over the entire production chain rather than upon isolated scientific breakthroughs. This reasoning leads naturally to the question of supply-chain vulnerability. Globalisation allowed technologically advanced States to optimise production through highly internationalised industrial networks, but the resulting efficiency generated dependencies that may become strategic liabilities during crises. Segura García therefore connects technological sovereignty directly with security and defence: States increasingly seek to ensure that they can manufacture, maintain and replace essential military systems without remaining excessively dependent upon foreign suppliers whose political interests may diverge from their own. The analysis of China’s control over critical materials provides an especially effective demonstration of this problem. The article highlights Beijing’s dominant role in graphite and rare-earth production and processing, resources essential to advanced industrial and defence applications. Permanent magnets, batteries, electronics and numerous sophisticated weapons systems depend upon materials whose extraction or refinement is heavily concentrated in China. The author correctly emphasises that dependence upon critical minerals creates a strategic vulnerability even for States that retain world-leading capabilities in research, engineering and weapons design. The discussion of rare earths also provides a useful bridge between economic policy and military capability. Modern aircraft, naval vessels and other advanced weapons platforms incorporate substantial quantities of specialised minerals. Consequently, restrictions upon access to these materials may affect military production even where the State concerned possesses the relevant engineering expertise. The article thus demonstrates how contemporary economic coercion can operate through upstream control of apparently mundane industrial inputs. Particularly significant is the analysis of the American response to these vulnerabilities. The CHIPS Act, export restrictions on advanced integrated circuits and limitations upon the transfer of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment to China are presented as components of a wider technological-containment strategy. Segura García interprets this policy not simply as trade protectionism but as an attempt to slow China’s progress towards semiconductor self-sufficiency and preserve American technological leadership. In this context, the boundary between economic competition and national-security policy becomes increasingly difficult to identify. The article gives special attention to Pax Silica, a particularly interesting dimension of contemporary American economic diplomacy. Rather than attempting to secure only raw materials or final semiconductor products, the initiative seeks to construct trusted networks covering advanced materials, semiconductor manufacturing, artificial-intelligence hardware and the industrial ecosystems connecting them. The concept of friendshoring therefore acquires a strategic meaning: access to key technologies is progressively linked to geopolitical alignment and political trust. This is one of the article’s strongest contributions. Segura García shows that supply-chain policy is becoming an instrument of alliance formation. The traditional strategic alliance was centred upon mutual defence commitments and military interoperability; emerging technological alliances increasingly incorporate access to minerals, semiconductor fabrication, artificial-intelligence infrastructure and advanced manufacturing. Economic security and national security are consequently converging. The section devoted to China’s technological response provides an important counterpoint. Rather than assuming that export controls will indefinitely preserve Western technological superiority, the author examines how restrictions have stimulated Chinese efforts towards indigenous innovation and self-sufficiency. The Digital Silk Road and other industrial policies are interpreted as part of a broader strategy designed to reduce dependence upon Western semiconductor technology and increase State control over critical technological capabilities. The discussion of extreme ultraviolet lithography is particularly relevant. Advanced semiconductor manufacturing depends upon highly specialised lithography systems, and the Dutch company ASML has occupied a uniquely important position in this field. Restrictions on the export of EUV equipment to China therefore created a major technological bottleneck. The article explains how this dependency has constrained China’s capacity to produce the most advanced chips while simultaneously encouraging the search for indigenous alternatives. Segura García avoids presenting Chinese technological progress as a fait accompli. The discussion of experimental Chinese EUV solutions based upon steady-state microbunching appropriately stresses the difference between achieving a technological prototype and obtaining a commercially scalable manufacturing process. This distinction is essential. Strategic technological independence ultimately requires reliable mass production, not merely laboratory-level capability. Nevertheless, the possibility that China may eventually reduce its dependence upon Western lithography systems has profound geopolitical implications. The author links this development to the so-called “Silicon Shield” protecting Taiwan. Taiwan’s extraordinary importance to the global semiconductor industry, particularly through TSMC, has long been regarded as a factor increasing the international costs of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. If China succeeds in constructing a sufficiently advanced indigenous semiconductor ecosystem, the strategic significance of this dependency could diminish, potentially modifying calculations surrounding deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. This connection between semiconductor production and deterrence constitutes one of the most stimulating parts of the article. Industrial geography is shown to possess direct strategic consequences. Factories, intellectual property, manufacturing machinery and supply chains are not merely commercial assets; they may influence calculations regarding war, coercion and alliance commitments. The article then turns to Europe, where the strategic dilemmas are particularly acute. The European Union simultaneously seeks economic competitiveness, open markets, strategic autonomy and reduced dependence upon external suppliers. Yet its vulnerabilities remain significant. Segura García argues that Europe may have paid both economic and strategic costs for participating in restrictions against China while remaining dependent upon Chinese critical materials and facing the possibility of increasingly competitive Chinese semiconductor production. The European response is examined through emerging defence-industrial and technological-sovereignty initiatives. The study situates semiconductor policy within a much broader technological race involving artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, robotics and hypersonic systems. These technologies are simultaneously drivers of economic growth and components of military superiority, while the critical raw materials necessary to manufacture them become increasingly important instruments of geopolitical leverage. Particularly relevant is the discussion of European technological sovereignty. The article interprets this concept as the capacity of the European Union to make te
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