CORTEXA
← Browse
arxivcs.LGcs.GT2026-07-09

Quota Marketplace: Dynamic Pricing for Efficient Allocation of ML Training Resources

Balasubramanian Sivan, Renato Paes Leme, Mihai Tiuca, Ian McFarlane, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nehal Mehta, Soheil Hassas Yeganeh, Vahab Mirrokni, Amin Vahdat

The escalating demand for Machine Learning (ML) training resources in recent years has resulted in a substantial gap between the high demand and the available supply. Efficient allocation of these scarce and expensive resources is crucial for organizations to maximize their return on investment. Existing resource allocation mechanisms, like Karma [OSDI'23], are designed to guarantee Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness in settings with dynamic (time-varying) user demands, but fail to preserve these key properties in the presence of demands with heterogeneous values. Given the ubiquity and inevitability of heterogeneity in organizational values of different workloads, effective resource allocation policies must accommodate these variations. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation, deployment, and theoretical analysis of Quota Marketplace, a market-based mechanism to efficiently allocate ML training chips (like GPUs), explicitly addressing scenarios with demands of heterogeneous value. We detail the implementation of this mechanism within Google and present metrics that demonstrate its impact. We also discuss many business-critical requirements that the Quota Marketplace handles quite effectively, and document the gains and opportunities it has unlocked. We establish theoretically how this market-based approach achieves the essential properties of Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness by allowing the users to express the value of their workloads and enabling dynamic resource pricing based on supply and demand fluctuations. Ultimately, the market facilitates resource allocation that aligns with organizational priorities.

View free PDFSource page

Related papers

arxivcs.LGcs.GT2026-07-07

Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao, Xin Chen, David Simchi-Levi

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negoti…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.GTcs.LGcs.MAmath.DSmath.OC2026-07-13

Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

Georgios Piliouras, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu, Luke Marris

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.ITcs.CRcs.GTcs.LGcs.NI2026-07-07

6G Sensing Security: Distributed Game-Theoretic RL for Urban Beamforming and Attacker Detection

Parmida Geranmayeh, Onur Günlü

In next-generation networks, communication systems will no longer be limited to data transmission and will be expected to acquire awareness of the surrounding environment. This leads to the concept of integrated sensing and communication (ISAC), where the same wireless infrastruc…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.GTcs.AIcs.LGcs.MA2026-07-10

Beyond Bayesian Nash: Learning Minimax-Regret Equilibria for Adversarial Team Games under Asymmetric Information

Naman Aggarwal, Jonathan P. How

Adversarial team games (ATGs) with asymmetric information, such as adversarial path-finding, goal search, and reachability games on graphs, require strategies that are robust to hidden opponent types, such as a hidden goal flag, and to deception. Under asymmetric information, dec…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.LGcs.GT2026-07-16

PAC Learning in Turn-Based Stochastic Games with Reachability Objectives: A Decentralized Private Approach via Expected Conditional Distance

Ali Asadi, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Pavol Kebis

Reachability is the most fundamental logical objective, yet it is notoriously difficult to learn in reinforcement learning settings: even for Markov decision processes, PAC learning of reachability is impossible without additional assumptions. This difficulty also holds in turn-b…

View free PDFSource page