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arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.MA2026-07-20

ChannelGuard: Safe Models Do Not Compose into Safe Multi-Agent Systems

Elias Hossain, Md Mehedi Hasan Nipu, Fatema Tuj Johora Faria, Tasfia Nuzhat Ornee, Maleeha Sheikh

Multi-agent LLM applications chain a planner, worker agents, a verifier, and a synthesizer, and every hop between agents is an unmonitored channel through which an adversary can smuggle instructions. Existing defenses guard only the input boundary (IBProtector, Llama Guard, perplexity filters, SmoothLLM) or run outside the application as opaque, stochastic provider-side filters. We show this gap carries a consequence rarely measured: on a 2,100-trace evaluation across eight attack families, five defenses, and three model backends, an undefended pipeline that appears fully safe under standard reporting (attack success 0.000 on tool- and memory-poisoning) owes that safety almost entirely to the cloud provider's server-side filter (54 of 60 blocks on Azure GPT-5), and silently shifts to the agent model's own alignment on a backend without such a filter. Outcome-only reporting hides this dependence. We present ChannelGuard, a training-free defense-in-depth framework placing information-bottleneck gates on every inter-agent channel; each scores channel text against an adversarial phrase bank by embedding similarity and deterministically passes, compresses, or blocks it, adding no LLM call, while an attribution method records which layer stopped each attack. ChannelGuard's tool-output gate blocks Tool Poisoning 30 of 30 at the application layer, identically across Azure GPT-5, Anthropic Sonnet 4.5, and Anthropic Haiku 4.5, whereas the undefended pipeline shifts entirely across backends; it also lowers Prompt Injection attack success by half (0.333 to 0.167) and preserves GSM8K accuracy exactly (0.867). White-box adaptive paraphrase evades every embedding gate, where a perturb-and-vote baseline does better. An extended appendix adds baselines, ablations, sweeps, a benign-preservation analysis, and a judge audit (kappa = 0.900), at a total cost of 47.36 USD.

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