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arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-06-27

Why Trust Your Agent? Empirical Security Gains from TRiSM-Guided Agentic Workflows in Healthcare

Liam Kearns

Agent-based AI has enabled the automation of tasks by exposing application tools and resources to large language models (LLMs). However, to improve scope and accuracy, agents are often given access rights that exceed those of ordinary users, introducing significant security risks. AI is routinely integrated into applications with a disregard to security, risking data exposure and breaching regulations. This paper applies the AI Trust, Risk, and Security Management (TRiSM) framework to a medical report-generation application to demonstrate how an insecure agent workflow can be transformed into security-conscious agentic workflow. Both workflows were evaluated across five LLMs (Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-4.1-nano, GPT-4.1-mini, GPT-5.4-mini, and Gemini 2.5 Flash) on two report types, totalling 800 generations and 500 attack scenarios including RAG poisoning, data-field injection, and client-side network injection. The TRiSM-guided agentic workflow reduced mean attack success rates from 31% to 10% for RAG poisoning and from 42% to 25% for data-field injection, while eliminating the network injection vector entirely through server-side prompt construction. Furthermore, report accuracy increased by 14 percentage points (72.5% to 86.5%) with the agentic workflow, demonstrating a secure design which provides more reliable outputs. This paper contributes to knowledge by demonstrating least-privilege, defence in depth agentic workflows improving security and accuracy, while also highlighting model choice is a necessary architectural consideration.

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