Agent security is widely treated as a question about action content. Defenses ask whether an instruction looks malicious. Benchmarks ask whether an agent performs a harmful sounding action. \textbf{We argue that agent security is fundamentally a contextual problem, and that the c…
Tool-augmented large language models extend their capabilities beyond parametric knowledge through external tools, but tend to invoke them unnecessarily. We investigate whether tool-use decisions have any stable internal representation that can be extracted and manipulated, a que…
Claw-like AI agents (e.g., OpenClaw) are always-on processes with persistent access to credentials, files, tools, and external services. They take on system-level responsibilities -- installing packages, maintaining state, scheduling subtasks, and mediating I/O -- making security…
Predicting human item difficulty is central to educational assessment, where reliable estimates support fairness and effective test construction. Existing methods often depend on costly human calibration or item-level textual representations, providing limited evidence about the…