CORTEXA
← Browse
arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-07-03

Securing Multi-Tool AI Agent Chains With Dynamic, Real-Time Compositional Policies

Chris Schneider, Kriti Faujdar, Philipp Schoenegger, Ben Bariach

Modern AI agent implementations such as frontier coding agents chain multiple tools at runtime that create a security surface that per-tool guardrails are unable to address, as individually permitted tools can violate organizational policies when composed. We propose the Dynamic Security Control Compositor (DSCC), a two-phase approach to compositional security for multi-tool agent chains. In Phase 1, at session checkout, a Most Restrictive Set (MRS) algorithm composes per-tool security policies into a single effective policy with a formal monotonicity invariant that extending a chain can only tighten the result, blocking incompatible combinations before any tool executes. Outputs of any tool call propagate their classification constraints into a session-level taint state, so subsequent invocations must satisfy the most restrictive constraints seen so far. In Phase 2, at runtime, the system tracks the sensitivity of data the agent touches through a monotonic taint state and revokes the session if the accumulated exposure would make a subsequent tool call a policy violation. Together, these phases provide defense in depth, where static composition prevents unsafe chains from starting, and runtime taint tracking catches violations that emerge from the specific data used. We provide a reference implementation on 32 tools governed by 16 NIST SP 800-53 aligned policies and evaluate it under two composition modes. In the default clearance mode, permitted combinations are partitioned into classification-level clusters, blocking 79.2% of policy pairs and 95.5% of triples. The alternative taint mode admits mixed-classification chains within the exfiltration boundary, blocking 42.5% and 60.5% respectively. We discuss the governance implications for organizations deploying multi-tool agents, including the utility-security tradeoff and the changes needed to operationalize chain-aware policies.

View free PDFSource page

Related papers

arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-07-07

The Balkanization of Execution-Security Research for AI Coding Agents: Isolation, Access Control, and Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities

Mohammadreza Rashidi

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-06-25

ShareLock: A Stealthy Multi-Tool Threshold Poisoning Attack Against MCP

Liwei Liu, Tianzhu Han, Zijian Liu, Zishu Dong, Na Ruan

With the rapid evolution of LLM-driven agents, Model Context Protocol (MCP), an open protocol bridging LLMs with external tools, has quickly become foundational to modern agent ecosystems. However, the expanding adoption of MCP has also introduced novel security concerns such as…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.ROeess.SY2026-07-20

RT-SHCUA: Real-Time Self-Hosted Computer-Use Agent for UAV Control

Di Lu, Bo Zhang, Xiyuan Li, Yongzhi Liao, Xuewen Dong, Yulong Shen, et al.

Natural-language control offers a promising interface for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but directly applying self-hosted computer-use agents (SHCUAs) to UAV control introduces a structural mismatch. SHCUAs are designed for interactive host-side tool use, where delayed agent i…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-07-06

Agent Data Injection Attacks are Realistic Threats to AI Agents

Woohyuk Choi, Juhee Kim, Taehyun Kang, Jihyeon Jeong, Luyi Xing, Byoungyoung Lee

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-co…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-06-29

MESA: Prioritizing Vulnerable Communication Channels for Securing Multi-Agent Systems

Kunyang Li, Kyle Domico, Jonathan Gregory, Patrick McDaniel

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used to automate complex, distributed workflows. However, their inter-agent communication channels introduce new attack surfaces that remain poorly understood and are difficult to defend against. In this paper, we address how defenders s…

View free PDFSource page