Plausible Deniability Guarantees for Whistleblowers
Whistleblowers are a key safeguard against organizational wrongdoing, but the threat of retaliation deters reporting. Existing whistleblower-protection proposals lack formal privacy guarantees, and existing differential privacy mechanisms do not directly target the natural threat model -- one in which the audited organization itself observes auditor selection decisions and uses them to identify reporters. We formalize protection against a strong-adversary threat model as per-report $(0, δ)$-differential privacy on the transcript of audit selections. Within this framework we prove that a natural approach -- randomized response applied at the selection step -- can never outperform uniform random auditing by more than $δ$ at any horizon. We then give a generic mechanism that reduces private auditing to private continual counting: any $(0, δ)$-DP continual counter plugs in by post-processing, and the audit transcript inherits the same per-report guarantee. Instantiating the reduction with a recent work in continual counting yields per-report $(0, δ)$-DP with noise scaling as $O(\sqrt{\log T})$ across a horizon of $T$ audit decisions. A utility theorem shows that the selection error vanishes whenever the noisy report gap between the most-reported organization and the runner-up grows faster than $\sqrt{\log T}$. Simulations show a substantial improvement over randomized response.