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arxivcs.LGcs.AIcs.GTmath.CO2026-07-09

AlphaZero in Sparsely Rewarded Games: Limits and Auxiliary Supervision

Brent Kong, Tejas Ram, Tony Yue Yu

AlphaZero has demonstrated that a neural-guided Monte Carlo Tree Search can achieve superhuman performance, but strong play does not necessarily imply perfect play. We study this gap in two oracle-evaluable domains with contrasting structure: Connect Four, a solved partisan game with exact game-theoretic values, and Chomp, an impartial game whose optimal play is governed by Grundy-number structure. Under a unified self-play $+$ MCTS pipeline, we compare vanilla AlphaZero, a multi-frame variant (limited to Chomp), and an AlphaZero Auxiliary Loss (AZAL) that adds oracle-derived policy supervision. We find that vanilla AlphaZero achieves strong play across both domains but cannot preserve the exact trajectories required for optimal play: in Connect Four, it fails to maintain the optimal line of play, while in Chomp, it fails to consistently restore the $g=0$ invariant. On rectangular Chomp boards, multi-frame inputs alone do not remove this gap. Nevertheless, AZAL substantially improves oracle consistency across multi-seeded full-game traces and sampled-state evaluations. On Chomp, AZAL reaches perfect full-game oracle consistency on 10x11 and high but not complete consistency on 9x10; on Connect Four, AZAL improves oracle-match rate and delays the first oracle mistake, but does not reach perfect play.

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In two-player zero-sum games whose Nash equilibria form a convex set, regularized solvers such as Regularized Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) empirically select the maximum-entropy member: the information projection (I-projection) of a uniform reference onto the Nash set. On a panel of sma…

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