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arxivcs.CRcs.AIstat.AP2026-06-26

Agentic AI-Powered Re-Identification: An Emerging, Scalable Threat to Mobility Microdata Privacy

Oscar Thees, Roman Müller, Matthias Templ

The widespread collection of fine-grained location data by commercial data brokers creates a re-identification risk that is not widely recognised by the public. While prior research has established that mobility traces are highly unique and that individuals can, in principle, be identified from a handful of spatio-temporal points, such attacks have historically required significant manual effort from skilled analysts, limiting their practical scale. In this feasibility study, we demonstrate in a real world setting that agentic AI fundamentally changes this threat model. We present an end-to-end pipeline in which large language model agents autonomously search the open web, cross-reference public records and social media, and resolve raw coordinate sequences to candidate identities - without human intervention. We evaluate the pipeline on a spatio-temporal dataset containing simulated location points anchored at and around true home and work addresses, focusing on a high-risk disclosure scenario. Our results demonstrate that, from spatio-temporal data and public sources alone, our agentic AI successfully re-identified 18 of the 25 re-identifiable individuals (72%) and 18 of 43 cases overall (41.9%). We discuss implications for Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) practice and outline the near-future escalation that data custodians and regulators must anticipate. De facto anonymity - an implicit foundation of SDC practice - is shifting. Agentic AI strengthens the case that re-identification is reasonably likely by any means under the GDPR Recital-26 standard, at costs of minutes-and-dollars per target.

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