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arxivcs.GTcs.AI2026-07-03

Teaming Up with AI: Coordination and Cooperation

Nicole Immorlica, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Successful diffusion of AI in the workforce hinges on the economic value that AI brings to human endeavors. Bringing AI into the workforce is more than deploying a powerful new technology -- it is launching a new form of collaboration. Each human worker is now endowed with a team of AI agents; work can be delegated to these agents, and the role of the human shifts towards managing and monitoring. How can we maximize the economic value from collaboration with AI in the workforce? How can we make it a "true" collaboration that empowers human workers rather than replacing them? We take an approach that combines the fields of theoretical computer science and economics, highlighting the potential of algorithmic tools grounded in economic principles to improve the effectiveness of human-AI collective work. We consider two tiers of tools: (1) tools for better coordination, via algorithmic management of interdependencies; (2) tools for better cooperation, via contractual incentive alignment. We show how a principled approach based on algorithmic and economic research enhances both coordination and cooperation, charting a pathway for future research to inform AI markets.

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