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arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.IRcs.LG2026-07-09

Beware What You Autocomplete: Forensic Attribution of Backdoored Code Completions

Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Zhuqing Liu, Minghong Fang

Large language models have enabled powerful code completion systems that assist developers by predicting subsequent lines of code. However, these models remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious fine-tuning data covertly implants unsafe behaviors. Despite advances in defensive techniques, adaptive and sophisticated backdoor attacks still evade detection and mitigation. We present CodeTracer, a forensic framework that traces malicious code completions back to the backdoor fine-tuning data responsible for them. Operating under realistic post-deployment constraints, CodeTracer relies solely on the fine-tuning corpus and the reported miscompletion event. It extracts a structured behavioral fingerprint from the compromised output, narrows the search to semantically relevant code samples, and employs LLM-based reasoning to attribute unsafe logic to specific backdoor data. Extensive evaluations across three representative vulnerability cases and ten backdoor attacks, along with sixteen competitive baselines, demonstrate that CodeTracer consistently achieves high forensic accuracy, low false identification rates, and strong robustness against adaptive attacks.

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FLINT: Fingerprinting Federated Learning Architectures from 5G PHY-Layer Side Channels

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Federated Learning (FL) over 5G cellular networks protects raw data but remains vulnerable to side-channel leakage. Prior fingerprinting attacks assume packet-level network visibility, an assumption that does not hold at the 5G Physical (PHY) layer, where user payloads are encryp…

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