Decentralized Aggregation of LLM Predictions via Wagering Mechanisms

Yuhong Luo, David M. Pennock, Xintong Wang

It is increasingly common to aggregate predictions from multiple LLMs, each with domain expertise or access to private tools and data, to improve collective prediction performance. In decentralized settings, aggregation weights need to be determined without access to models' private information and should remain robust to strategic reporting. We propose a family of advantage-aligned wagering mechanisms for LLM aggregation (WALLA), in which each model reports a prediction and a learned wager, and predictions are aggregated using wagers as weights. WALLA introduces a leave-one-out baseline into the net payout function, yielding three desirable properties: (1) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of prediction under arbitrary belief structure, (2) advantage--wager alignment, where the optimal wager is proportional to the model's expected score advantage, and (3) prediction-agnostic wager optimization, enabling decentralized learning of wager policies without requiring optimal predictions. We further instantiate two mechanism variants that trade off normality and no-arbitrage while maintaining a bounded worst-case deficit for the mechanism. Experiments on question-answering and forecasting benchmarks across heterogeneous models and private-information settings show that WALLA matches centralized aggregation methods in predictive performance, while simultaneously achieving decentralized learning, advantage-aligned aggregation weights, uncertainty awareness, and incentive-compatible prediction.